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Abstract: Humans are certainly unique among living species. This is evident in the transformation
of human environments and its resulting impact on other animals. However, many of the traits
unique to humans are costly as well as adaptive and should certainly not be used to elevate their
status above that of other species.
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Like many authors before them, Chapman & Huffman (2018) (C & H) pose the question of whether
humans are unique among species. This question is irrelevant for several reasons. First, I agree
with Shackelford (2018) that the question does not bear on the issue of ethical treatment because
any organism can suffer and suffering should be eliminated whenever possible. Second, I agree
with all commentators that all species are unique because each has evolved specialized
adaptations for its own social and physical environment, and each has been shaped by its own
evolutionary history. Third, I agree with Juergens (2018) in particular in arguing that it is almost
foolhardy to debate whether humans possess some important attributes that are not exhibited
by any other species.
One critical aspect of human uniqueness is the degree of empathy exhibited toward others
— in particular, toward other species – as well as a more widespread concern for the well-being
of the ecosystem. As Juergens states, this attribute positions humans uniquely to respond to the
writings of authors like C & H. I am reminded of the famous quote by Albert Bandura (cited in
Schultz & Schultz, 2016, p. 257), “It is amusing to see radical behaviorists, who contend that
thoughts have no causal influence, devoting considerable time to speeches, articles, and books in
an effort to convert people’s behavior to their way of thinking.” It is also amusing to see writers
make a plea specific to humans while disavowing the unique ability of humans to respond.
A related human attribute is the capacity to comprehend the meaning of death. As
Brosnan and Vonk (2019) have recently reported, there is little evidence that even other primates
understand death with regard to its finality, inevitability, and abstractness. This constraint may
have implications for animal welfare discussions because animals that cannot comprehend their
own deaths (and indeed the richness of their own existences) may not suffer in the way that
humans do when placed in situations where death is unavoidable. This is not to say that humans
are superior, nor that superiority would justify cruel treatment of animals. However, it is wise to
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consider that humans’ assumptions about animals’ experiences may suffer more from
anthropomorphism than from fact. Whereas it is clear that animals can feel physical pain and
emotional distress, it is wrong to assume that they suffer from anticipation of death. Hence, we
should certainly treat them humanely, but we may not need to treat them the way we would
treat other humans.
C & H, along with Benvenuti (2018), argue that many of the claims for human uniqueness
have been refuted. I would also disagree with this statement. Although it is true that science has
chipped away at the idea that humans exhibit strong cognitive discontinuities from other species,
it remains uncontestable that humans demonstrate a degree of cognitive capacity that is
unparalleled. Even if one accepts that other animals use tools, they do not exhibit the same sort
of causal reasoning humans do. Even if nonhumans are aware to some degree of perception,
knowledge, and intentions in other beings, evidence suggests that they do not flexibly apply
knowledge of others’ mental states across a wide range of contexts. No other species meets the
criterion for language. Perhaps most indisputable is the fact that no other species develops and
uses technology, especially to explore other environments, such as deep sea and outer space.
Ironically, C & H themselves reject the notion of categorical thinking. The claims of human
uniqueness are refuted only if one thinks in terms of such all or none capacities. Rather, if one
thinks of capacities as varying along a continuum – an idea that is more in keeping with
evolutionary processes – it is difficult to dismiss claims that humans stand apart from other
species. Most important, it is not necessary to refute such claims to find value in other species.
That humans are unique in all these ways, and many more, in no means detracts from the
sentiment that other species are also unique – probably in ways humans cannot even conceive.
We do not echolocate. We do not navigate using geomagnetic cues or detect infra-red radiation.
However, it is possible that humans are the only species that exhibit cognitive tendencies not
present in any other species currently living, which may make them the most unique. It is also
likely that the ways in which humans are unique have had a more profound impact on the
environment compared to any other species (see again, Juergens 2018). Human technology has
transformed, polluted and destroyed the environment to an unmatched degree. Thus, humans
certainly are unique, but not necessarily in a way that will be adaptive in the long run. We should
channel our unique traits toward conserving the planet for all the species that inhabit it, rather
than denigrating other beings that differ in important and fascinating ways.
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